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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1972 TERM
APPELLATE REVIEW OF TnREE-JuDGE DisTucr COURTS
Thoms v. Heffernan
The statutory scheme authorizing three-judge district courts' pro-
vides for direct Supreme Court review2 of decisions granting or deny-
ing injunctions against the enforcement of state statutes. Despite the
broad language of the statute, the Supreme Court has always taken a
very narrow view of its jurisdiction over direct appeals.3 Concern over
the Court's rising caseload has led, in recent years, to an even more
restrictive interpretation on the direct review statute.4 Thorns v.
Heffernan,5 a recent Second Circuit decision, illustrates the conun-
drum created by this restrictive approach.
William Thoms brought a class action seeking to enjoin the en-
128 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) requires the convening of a three-judge district court when a
party seeks to enjoin state officials from enforcing state statutes.
Congress enacted the three-judge court legislation in response to a rash of injunc-
tions against state regulatory and legislative policies issued by single federal judges. See
Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471, 476 (1970); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116
(1965); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 154 (1962); Note, Federal Jurisdiction
- Three-Judge Courts -The Recent Evolution in Jurisdiction and Appellate Review, 61
MicH. L. Rnv. 1528, 1529 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Federal Jurisdiction]; Note, The
Three-Judge District Court and Appellate Review, 49 VA. L. Rv. 588, 539 (1963).
In order to convene a three-judge court, the plaintiff must allege in his complaint a
substantial claim of unconstitutionality. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91 nA (1968); Idlewild
Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962); Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30
(1933); Note, The Three-Judge District Court and Appellate Review, 49 VA. L. REv. 538,
551 (1963).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) provides:
Except as othervise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme
Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocu-
tory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by
an Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges.
Direct Supreme Court review of these decisions was provided to guard against unwar-
ranted judicial interference with state legislation and to insure that state statutes would
be reviewed expeditiously. Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 1529. See Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 155 (1962). Moreover, the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is exclusive since the courts of appeals have jurisdiction over final deci-
sions of district courts only if no direct review is available. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
3 See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Phillips v. United States,
312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941); Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 567 (1928).
The Court has noted that the requirement for three-judge district courts is not "..
a measure of broad social policy to be construed with great liberality, but technical in
the strict sense of the term and to be applied as such." Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S.
427, 431 (1970) (per curiam), quoting Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941).
4 See McCann v. Babbitz, 400 U.S. 1 (1970) (per curiam), dismissing appeal from 310
F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.); Gunn v. University Comm. to End the War in Viet Nam, 399
U.S. 383 (1970); Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 US. 427 (1970); Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical
Center, Inc., 397 U.S. 820 (1970) (per curiam), vacating 305 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
5473 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S., Apr. 9, 1973)
(No. 72-1359). The panel majority consisted of Judges Mansfield and Oakes. Judge Timbers
dissented.
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forcement of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the desecration of the
American and state flags. 6 The allegation of a serious constitutional
issue and the request for injunctive relief required the convening of
a three-judge district court.7 The three-judge court declared the statute
unconstitutionally broad, but declined to issue the requested injunc-
tion.s The court found "no reason to believe defendants will continue
to enforce § 53-255 upon notice of this decision; accordingly, we forbear
to enter an injunction restraining them from enforcing it."
The threshold question in Thorns was whether the court of ap-
peals had jurisdiction over a decision of a three-judge district court
wherein that court forbore from issuing the requested injunction. By
adopting a narrow construction of the direct appeal statute the Second
Circuit interpreted the district court's forbearance as a postponement
of the decision and not a grant or denial of the injunction.10 Accord-
ingly, the court found that it had jurisdiction. Since the district court
had issued a declaratory judgment holding the state statute unconsti-
tutional and it was impossible to know whether an injunction might
ever be issued,"- the court stated that it was the proper appellate forum
just "as if only a declaratory judgment and not an injunction were
sought in the first instance."' 2
Judge Timbers disagreed with the majority's reasoning and, in his
dissent, suggested that the forbearance was similar to a denial of the
6Thorns had expressed a desire to wear a vest that was made from an authentic
American flag as a protest of America's Indochina policies. Thoms v. Smith, 334 F. Supp.
1203, 1206 n.5 (D. Conn. 1971), aff'd sub. nom. Thorns v. Heffernan, 473 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.
1973). However, 28 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-258a (Supp. 1972) prohibited the place-
ment, for exhibition or display, of any inscription, symbol, or advertisement on the flags.
It also provided that anyone who "publicly misuses, mutilates, tramples upon, or other-
wise defaces, defiles, or puts indignity upon any of such flags .. ." is subject to punish-
ment. Id.
The statute the plaintiff originally complained of was 28 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-255 (1960). Both statutes are identical in substance, but section 53-258a calls for
stiffer penalties. Although the statute under attack had technically been repealed, the
Second Circuit allowed the action to continue because the threat to the plaintiff had
actually increased. 473 F.2d at 483 n.1.
7 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). See note 1 supra.
8 Thoms v. Smith, 334 F. Supp. 1203, 1211 (D. Conn. 1971), aJJ'd sub nom. Thorns v.
Heffernan, 473 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1973).
9 334 F. Supp. at 1211 (emphasis added).
10 473 F.2d at 480, citing Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471, 478 (1970). There the Court
held that direct appellate jurisdiction is to be "narrowly construed," and noted that
"[t]his admonition ... requires us to resolve all reasonable doubts against direct appeal-
ability of a judgment to the Supreme Court." 473 F.2d at 480.
11 The Second Circuit considered the possibility that notwithstanding the declaratory
judgment the state might choose to enforce the statute. If this should happen, Thorns
would be permitted to renew his request for an injunction and the court believed that
such relief would probably be ordered by the three-judge district court. 473 F.2d at 480
n.l.
12 Id. at 481.
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injunction.13 Moreover, Judge Timbers objected to the district court
having the ability to determine which appellate court would review its
decision by forbearing from entering an injunction. 4
The decision of the Second Circuit on the question of jurisdiction
accords with the Supreme Court's construction of the direct review
provision.15 In Gunn v. University Committee to End the War in Viet
Nam, 6 it was held that because the district court had not issued either
an injunction or an order granting or denying one, the Supreme Court
had no power at all over the case. The Court has also held that an
order granting or denying only a declaratory judgment is not directly
appealable to the Supreme Court, even if injunctive relief was once
requested.' 7
'3 Id. at 487. Judge Timbers contended that if the three-judge court forbears from
issuing an injunction, it loses its jurisdictional basis and should dissolve itself but he failed
to cite any authority for this proposition. An approach whereby a court's jurisdictional
basis is eliminated by virtue of its subsequent holding is unsound. Once the jurisdic-
tional predicate is satisfied the court acquires the power to adjudicate. In several cases dealing
with three-judge district courts, the Supreme Court has held that where such a court issues a
declaratory judgment, appeal may be taken to a court of appeals even though injunctive
relief was once requested. See McCann v. Babbitz, 400 U.S. 1 (1970) (per curiam); Mitchell
v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427, 430 (1970) (per curiam). Thus, the relevant authority appears
to be inapposite to the dissent's approach.
14473 F.2d at 487. The majority in Thorns refused to characterize the district court's
decision in this way. Rather, they assumed that the forbearance was based upon the rea-
soning that a declaratory judgment issued under the facts of this case does not offend
comity as much as an injunction does. Id. at 481. See note 41 infra and accompanying
text, where the viability of this proposition is discussed.
Judge Timbers also cited Abele v. Markle, 4 F. Supp. 800, 804-05 (D. Conn. 1972),
where the three-judge district court granted only declaratory relief because "there is no
reason to believe the state will not obey our mandate." There, the Second Circuit panel
remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the decision not to issue
the injunction. Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410
U.S. 951 (1973). The Thorns majority distinguished Abele on the grounds that the district
court majority was split on the question of injunctive relief, while in Thorns all three
judges agreed to forbear. 473 F.2d at 481.
15 See notes 3 & 4 supra.
16 399 U.S. 383, 890 (1970). The district court had declared the Texas statute involved
unconstitutional, but stayed its mandate pending action by the state legislature at its
next session. 289 F. Supp. 469, 475 (W.D. Tex. 1968). The Supreme Court dismissed the di-
rect appeal noting that "until a district court issues an injunction, or enters an order
denying one, it is simply not possible to know with any certainty what the court has de-
cided ..... " 899 U.S. at 388. This reasoning would not apply to Thorns where the court
actually issued a declaratory judgment against the state statute because although no in-
junction was granted, the rights of the parties were adjudicated.
It is also significant to note that in Gunn, the Court warned three-judge district
courts of the jurisdictional problems created when declaratory relief is granted but injunc-
tive relief is refused. The Court noted that failure to issue an injunction under such cir.
cumstances is "unfortunate at best." 399 U.S. at 390. Had the district court in Thorns
heeded this admonition and issued an injunction along with its declaratory judgment, a
complex jurisdictional wrangle could have been avoided.
17 399 U.S. at 890-91. McCann v. Babbitz, 400 U.S. 1 (1970) (per curiam); Mitchell v.
Donovan, 898 U.. 427, 430 (1970) (per curiam); Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center,
Inc., 397 U.S. 820 (1970) (per curiam).
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Nonetheless, the Court has on occasion taken a different approach.
It has said that its appellate jurisdiction depends on whether the three-
judge court was properly convened.' 8 Direct appeal would then be
based on whatever grounds were given for the granting or denial of
the injunction. 19 This approach seems more consonant with the con-
gressional intent to have the Supreme Court review expeditiously
decisions affecting the validity of state statutes. 20 However, the Court
has insisted on technical compliance with the statutory language in
order to keep its caseload within manageable proportions.21
In Mitchell, the Court ruled that the statutory term "injunction" found in the di-
rect appeal section, 28 U.S.C. § 1253, does not embrace "declaratory judgment." 398 U.S.
at 430. However, Mitchell is distinguishable from Thorns on the facts. The plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the enforcement of a Minnesota statute prohibiting the placement of
Communists on the election ballot. The plaintiffs' original request covered only the 1968
election. When they tried to renew their action after the 1968 election in order to cover
future elections, the district court ruled that their request had become moot. Id. at 428-
29.
McCann and Rockefeller offer more direct support for the Thorns decision. In Rocke-
feller, the three-judge district court stated that: "Since the state has shown a desire to
comply with applicable federal requirements, the court may assume that it will abide by
a judicial determination of rights without having to be compelled to do so by injunction."
305 F. Supp. 1268, 1271 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). Thus, the court granted a declaratory judgment
striking down a New York statute temporarily freezing rates for in-patient hospital ser-
vices provided to Medicare patients but denied a requested injunction. Id. The Supreme
Court held that no direct appeal was available, but vacated the judgment below in order
to allow the lower court to issue a fresh decree which could be appealed to the court of
appeals. 397 U.S. 820.
In McCann, the Court, citing Mitchell and Gunn, dismissed an appeal from a decision
of a three-judge court granting a declaratory judgment but denying an injunction against
the enforcement of the Wisconsin abortion statute. 400. U.S. 1 (1970) (per curiam), dismis-
sing appeal from 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
18 Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.. 405 U.S. 538, 541 n.5 (1972); Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 560 (1969); Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 99 (1967); United States
v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285, 287 (1963); Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po,
356 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1949); Rorick v. Board of Comm'rs, 307 U.S. 208, 212 (1939); Palmetto
Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Applying this approach to Thorns, where the
federal question was substantial thereby warranting a three-judge district court, appeal
should have been directly to the Supreme Court and not the Second Circuit.
19 See Brucker v. Fisher, 49 F.2d 759, 761 (6th Cir. 1931). Thus, it should not matter
that the three-judge court in Thorns denied the request for an injunction because of
reasons of comity. Both a denial on grounds of comity and a denial on the merits have
the effect of allowing the state to enforce its statute. See Oldroyd v. Kugler, 461 F.2d 535,
539 (3d Cir. 1972).
20 See note 2 supra.
21 See Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471, 478 (1970); Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po,
336 U.S. 368, 375 (1949); Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
Direct appeals now constitute 20% of the Supreme Court's docket. 41 U.S.L.W. 2094-
95 (August 22, 1972). However, even when the three-judge statute was enacted and the
federal caseload was far less than it is today, Congress was aware "it was imposing a severe
burden on the courts." Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 569 (1928). Nonetheless it chose to
do so. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 562 (1969). This imposition was
apparently based on a feeling that certain classes of cases were so important that the Su-
preme Court should be required to review them. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court
in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 74 (1964).
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1972 TERM
The application of apparently conflicting standards by the Su-
preme Court has led to a split among the circuits. The Fifth Circuit
has held that if the allegations of unconstitutionality are substantial,
the three-judge court must then determine the validity of the state
statute and the only review of that decision is by the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit, in Petusky v. Ramptonm ac-
cepted jurisdiction of an appeal from a three-judge court decision dis-
solving a temporary restraining order. The court reasoned that since
there was no order granting or denying an injunction, the Supreme
Court would refuse jurisdiction. Yet the First Circuit ruled that an
order requiring a federal agency to return property forfeited pursuant
to a federal statute was an order granting an injunction for purposes
of the three-judge court statute.2 4
One panel of the Third Circuit has ruled that an appeal from a
declaratory judgment issued by a three-judge court, which denied
injunctive relief, is to the court of appeals.25 However, in Qidroyd v.
Kugler,26 a case remarkably similar to Thorns, another Third Circuit
panel held that the mere fact that a three-judge court has not explicitly
denied an injunction is not dispositive. The court ruled that inasmuch
as the three-judge court was properly convened and part of the judg-
ment was a decision on the merits, the case was directly appealable to
the Supreme Court.27
The First Circuit, while recognizing both the Supreme Court's interest in limiting its
caseload and the need to reform present three-judge court legislation, observed that: "Con-
gress has not seen fit to alter its provisions, and while it remains on the books, there is
value in not frustrating both its purpose and its predictability of operation." Melendez
v. Shultz, 486 F.2d 1032, 1034 (1st Cir. 1973). Indeed, the Court's policy of attempt-
ing to regulate its direct review docket "has not resulted in a clear definition of
the jurisdictional scope of the three-judge court. Instead, it has substantially complicated
the problem of the litigant who seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the appropriate fed-
eral court . . ." Federal jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 1530.
Chief Justice Burger has been reported as favoring the total elimination of the three-
judge courts because of their disruptive effect on the federal judicial system. He also dis-
approves of direct appeals to the Supreme Court without benefit of intermediate appellate
review. 41 U.S.L.W. 2094-95 (August 22, 1972).
The Second Circuit has also suggested the need for repeal or amendment of the
three-judge court provisions. Nieves v. Oswald, 477 F.2d 1109, 1111 (2d Cir. 1973) (Fein-
berg, J.). See p. 389, infra, for a detailed treatment of Nieues.
The long-sought revision of the three-judge court statutes may be at hand. See note
28 infra.
22 Coleman v. Yokum, 442 F.2d 351, 353 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Mayhue's Super
Liquor Store v. Meiklejohn, 426 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1970).
23 431 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 913 (1971).
24 Melendez v. Shultz, 486 F.2d 1032 (1st Cir. 1973).
25 YWCA v. Kugler, 463 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
26 461 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'g 327 F. Supp. 176 (DN.J. 1970), wherein the Third
Circuit reversed a three-judge court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of the plaintiff's at-
tack on the constitutionality of the New Jersey flag anti-desecration statute.
27 Id. at 539.
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The majority opinion in Thorns apparently has rejected the
"properly convened" line of cases in favor of the cases which have
given an extremely narrow construction to the direct appeal provision,
section 1253. By not remanding the three-judge court's "forbearance"
the Second Circuit has ratified its approach. The effect of this portion
of Thorns will be to further limit the availability of direct Supreme
Court review of three-judge district court decisions. Additionally,
the jurisdictional maze in which the court found itself enmeshed and
the conflicting precedents which exist serve to illustrate the need for
revision of the statutes governing the three-judge district courts.28
Having concluded that direct appeal to the Supreme Court was
unwarranted, the Thorns panel grappled with the question of finality.
Insofar as the three-judge court forbore from issuing an injunction, its
decision was susceptible to the charge that it was not a final decision
and therefore not reviewable. This claim was rejected by the Second
Circuit, which held that the three-judge court's decision was a final
28 The Senate has passed and sent to the House of Representatives a bill that would
repeal sections 2281-82 and 2284. Instead the bill would require a district court of three
judges to meet only when: "otherwise required by an Act of Congress, or when an action
is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts
or the apportionment of any statewide legislative bodies." S. 271, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3
(1973). Thus, a single district judge could hear suits attacking the constitutionality of most
federal and state statutes.
In presenting the bill to the Senate, Senator Hruska noted that:
Our Federal judicial system is today experiencing a virtual explosion of litigation.
It is therefore essential that Congress do all that is prudent to refine and stream-
line the operations of our courts so as to facilitate the notion that for every
wrong there will exist a remedy which will be pursued with deliberate haste.
The elimination of the three-judge court requirement in certain anachronistic
situations ... is one positive innovation that pursues this goal.
119 CONG. REc. 11, 114 (daily ed. June 14, 1973).
The bill is a significant improvement over the present three-judge court statutes.
The jurisdictional problems that the Second Circuit was confronted with in Thorns
would be effectively avoided. Thoms' allegations did not concern the constitutionality of
an apportionment, thus not requiring a three-judge district court under the Senate's pro-
posal. Secondly, the bill does not continue the distinction presently made between actions
seeking injunctions and actions seeking declaratory relief. The bill, which speaks of ac-
tions "challenging" apportionments, would apparently require a three-judge court to
meet regardless of the form of the requested relief.
S. 271 would not eliminate the requirement that appeals from three-judge court ded-
sions be taken directly to the Supreme Court. However, since the number of three-judge
cases would be sharply limited, there would be a corresponding reduction in the caseload
of the Supreme Court.
The bill, which has the support of Chief Justice Burger and of the Judicial Con-
ference, has been the subject of hearings by a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee.
For proposals put forth by the American Law Institute and by the Judicial Con-
ference see ALI, STUDY OF DrIISoNs OF JURIsDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
§ 1374 (1969); REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 78-79 (1970).
[Vol. 48:355
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judgment appealable to the court of appeals. 29 The court noted that
the issue of constitutionality was the controlling question in the case
and that the district court had ruled on that issue. The fact that the
plaintiff might be able to renew his request for an injunction should
the state enforce the statute did not make the declaration of unconsti-
tutionality less than final. 30
The Second Circuit's decision is supported by the Supreme Court's
determination that a "final" decision does not have to be the last
possible order in the case.31 Thus, the question of finality is to be
viewed in a practical rather than technical light. The most important
considerations are whether piecemeal review is likely and whether
justice will be denied by virtue of a delay.82 While Thorns presented
no problems as to piecemeal review, delay in determining the consti-
tutionality of the statute could cause a further chilling of the first
amendment rights asserted by Thoms.33 Accordingly, the court deemed
the three-judge court's decision as final in order to protect the ap-
pellee's first amendment rights.34 Furthermore, as the court pointed
out, it would have been anomalous to treat the district court's decision
as a declaratory judgment for jurisdictional purposes and then decide
that the lower court's order was not final.35
Thorns also involved a problem as to the plaintiff's standing to
bring the action. Thorns informed several state officials by letter of his
intention to wear an American flag sewn into a vest. Three officials did
not respond to the letter. Two replied that they intended to enforce
the law. 6 The Second Circuit ruled that Thoms thereby faced a cred-
ible threat of enforcement and so had standing to seek relief in federal
court.
3 7
29 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) provides that the courts of appeals have jurisdiction over
appeals from final judgments of district courts, except where direct review by the Supreme
Court is available.
30 473 F.2d at 481.
61 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964); Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,545-46 (1949).
82 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964); Dickinson v.
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
33 473 F.2d at 482.
34 Id.
35 Id.
361d. at 484; 334 F. Supp. at 1206-07. Of the two state officials who replied, one
doubted that the proposed conduct would lead to Thorns' arrest. The other told Thorns
"go ahead and do it, and,... if you're in violation of the statute we'll lock you up." 334
F. Supp. at 1207 (emphasis added).
87 473 F.?d at 484. In first amendment cases, "it is possible that.., courts may rely on
a credible threat of enforcement and plausible allegations of intent or desire to engage in
the threatened activities as sufficient predicates for justiciability." National Student Ass'n
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At the same time Thoms brought his federal class action, Con-
necticut had commenced criminal proceedings against one Van Camp
for violation of the flag desecration statute.38 This aspect of Thorns
raised the question of whether it was proper for a federal court to de-
clare the Connecticut statute unconstitutional while the issue was
pending in the state court system. The Second Circuit determined that
the district court could properly issue a declaratory judgment striking
down the statute in question as unconstitutional."9
Recently, the Supreme Court has considered the circumstances
under which a federal court may interfere with ongoing state pro-
ceedings. In Younger v. Harris,40 the Court held that federal courts
should not enjoin the enforcement of a state statute where there are
pending state criminal proceedings against the federal plaintiff absent
a showing of irreparable injury which is both "great and immediate."
v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1969). However, Thorns really did not face
a credible threat of enforcement. Both state officials who bothered to reply to the letter
indicated some doubt that he would be prosecuted. The effect of Thorns in this regard
is to allow a plaintiff to create his own standing. Connecticut would have been in a bet-
ter position if its officials had not bothered to reply to Thorns at all.
Thorns' position is similar to the position of the co-plaintiffs in Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1971), who had not been indicted, arrested or threatened by the
prosecutor. Instead, they alleged that they felt inhibited by the existence of a state statute
on the books and by the existence of the prosecution against Harris. The Supreme Court
held these allegations were not sufficient to make the co-plaintiffs proper parties. Id. at 42.
In this light it is interesting to consider the Second Circuit's observation in Thon that
"there had been a series of prosecutions against persons symbolically expressing their
views on various subjects, resulting in jail sentences in two instances and fines in three
others." 473 F.2d at 485. The court should not have considered these other prosecutions
factors in determining whether or not Thorns had standing. Younger stated that prosecu-
tions against others are not sufficient to create standing and that "persons having no
fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be
accepted as appropriate plaintiffs .. " 401 U.S. at 42 (1971).
38 Van Camp had been arrested and convicted for wearing an American flag, around
which was bordered the words "For God and Country," on the seat of his pants.
The state court proceedings resulted in the upholding of the constitutionality of the
statute. State v. Van Camp, 6 Conn. Cir. 609, 281 A.2d 584 (App. Div.), certification of
appeal denied, 161 Conn. 591, 280 A.2d 536 (1971). Van Camp never requested Supreme
Court review.
39 473 F.2d at 482-83.
40 401 U.S. 35, 46 (1971). The policy of restricting the issuance of injunctions in this
situation is based on both traditional equity jurisprudence and principles of comity. Id.
at 43-44. From equity principles flows the requirement that in order to obtain an injunc-
tion a plaintiff must show irreparable injury. Id. at 45-46. Where comity is also involved,
the Court has added the requirement that federal courts should not issue injunctions un-
less the irreparable injury is both "great and immediate." Id. at 46. Bad faith prosecu-
tion and harassment by state officials clearly fall within the purview of "great and im-
mediate" irreparable harm.
If the Second Circuit in Thon had found Younger applicable it is submitted that
the appellee would not have been able to demonstrate such injury since he had not been
prosecuted, nor had he made any allegations of harassment. Indeed, the only contact he
had with state officials were communications which he initiated.
[V7ol. 48:355
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This holding was extended to proscribe declaratory judgments in
Samuels v. Mackell.41
Both the three-judge district court and the Second Circuit in
Thorns ruled that Younger and Samuels are limited to situations where
the state proceeding is aimed at the federal plaintiff himself and do
not apply when state proceedings are pending against other defen-
dants.42 In so ruling, the Second Circuit stated that if federal antici-
41401 US. 66 (1971). The Court's holding in Samuels appears to be a retreat from its
earlier position announced in Zwickler v. Koota, 389 US. 241 (1967). There the Court held
that the question of whether declaratory relief is proper should be considered apart from
the question of whether injunctive relief is appropriate.
However, the Court in Samuels was careful to limit its holding to situations where
there are pending state prosecutions. Nevertheless, the Court did recognize that absent
unusual circumstances, an injunction and a declaratory judgment would have similar ef-
fects and would result in the same frustration of state criminal proceedings. 401 US. at
73. Accord, Mitchell %. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427, 433 (1970) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting):
The declaratory judgment may well contain a "thou shalt not" as commanding
as any injunction. Or its refusal may be as definitive an adjudication as the re-
fusal of an injunction .... Where ...the three-judge court was properly con-
vened, I would think that any action it took, which was denying or granting an
injunction or its equivalent, would be properly here under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
42 473 F.2d at 482-83; 334 F. Supp. at 1205-06. Both courts relied on the statement in
Younger that: "We express no view about circumstances under which federal courts may
act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal prosecu-
tion is begun." 401 U.S. at 41 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court's use of the words "no prosecution" may be interpreted in two
ways. Either the Court meant no prosecution against only the federal plaintiff, or no
prosecution pending against anyone. Noting that Younger and its brethren did not re-
solve the question in Thorns, the Second Circuit adopted the former interpretation.
[he Supreme Court intended to leave open the question of whether the require-
ment of bad faith or of other extraordinary circumstances evidencing irreparable
injury, which the Younger group of cases affirmed for anticipatory federal court
intervention in pending suits, applies when no state criminal proceeding is pend-
ing against the federal plaintiff.
473 F.2d at 483.
The Younger decisions were motivated by considerations of equity, i.e., no injunctive
relief will lie where there is an adequate remedy at law, and comity, i.e., federal courts
should not invade areas of state concern. In view of the fact that Thoms was not in-
volved in a state proceeding, traditional equity reasons for restricting the issuance of an
injunction did not apply. There was no danger of irreparable injury nor was there any
other proceeding to be compromised by an inconsistent decision. However, the principles
regarding respect for state sovereignty remain very much in force. The Younger court
noted that federal courts do not have unlimited power to review state laws and determine
their validity before the state courts are asked to enforce them. It is seldom appropriate
for federal courts to "exercise any such power of prior approval over the legislative pro-
cess." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52-53 (1971). Federal courts are not allowed to un-
duly interfere with legitimate state activities. Id. at 44.
The Thorns court itself noted that the Younger group of cases suggest that, "absent
a showing of bad faith enforcement on the part of state officials, federal courts should
not 'reach out' and declare state statutes unconstitutional on their face." 473 F.2d at 482.
Yet in affirming the grant of declaratory relief to Thoms, the Second Circuit permitted such
a reaching out.
The teaching of Thorns seems to be that those potential plaintiffs who wish to test
the constitutionality of state statutes in federal courts are in a better position by not corn-
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patory relief was not available, the plaintiff would be forced to commit
acts that he believes are constitutionally protected under pain of
criminal prosecution. 43 The court also noted that a prosecution against
someone else might not resolve the plaintiff's doubts about his own
constitutional rights. 44 Since the state had not yet committed resources
to the prosecution of Thoms, his choice of forum should be given
significant weight.45
The Second Circuit's holding on this issue is open to question in
that Thoms did not and was not required to show either irreparable
harm or harassment by state authorities.46 The same constitutional
claims that Thoms was attempting to raise were being raised by Van
Camp in the state proceeding.47 Given the Supreme Court's policy of
restricting the availability of injunctive and declaratory relief, it
would be paradoxical if the state defendant, with his greater personal
stake in the outcome, could not obtain federal intervention, while
someone like Thoms, with less personal involvement, could obtain
federal relief. Nonetheless, the effect of the Second Circuit decision is
to exclude the applicability of Younger and Sarnuels when the federal
plaintiff is not the subject of a pending state prosecution. As such,
Thorns creates a broader access to federal anticipatory relief.
The doctrine of abstention provides that if a definitive ruling in a
state court on an unsettled question of state law would settle a contro-
versy and avoid the consideration of constitutional issues, the federal
courts should exercise discretion and stay their proceedings. 48 The
Thorns panel felt that abstention did not apply because the resulting
mitting the prohibited act. Rather, once the plaintiff can establish a "credible threat of
enforcement," which was easily established in Thorns, see notes 36 & 37 supra, and ac-
companying text, he is assured of a federal forum since the heavy burdens imposed by
Younger and Samuels will not be demanded of him.
43473 F.2d at 483. Such acts really would be avoidable but, if done, would cast a
greater burden on the plaintiff.
44 Id. In Thorns, this argument is supported by the fact that Van Camp never appealed
his conviction to the Supreme Court.
Connecticut has filed a petition for certiorari to review the Second Circuit's decision
in Thorns. The Supreme Court thus will have an opportunity to rule on the constitu-
tionality of the state statute and on the technical legal issues. Thorns v. Heffernan, 473
F.2d 478 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Apr. 9, 1973) (No. 72-1359).
45 Id.
46 Although the state had arrested others, the state had done nothing to Thorns, and
Thorns was the one who initially brought his case to the attention of the state authorities.
See 334 F. Supp. at 1206-07.
47 See note 38 supra.
48 Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970); City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See Note,
Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARv.
L. Rav. 604 (1967); Note, Doctrine of Abstention: Need of Reappraisal, 40 NonE DAME
LAW. 101 (1964).
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delay might cause a chilling of the very rights the plaintiff sought to
protect.49 Additionally, there were no state proceedings against the
plaintiff, and the state proceedings that existed against Van Camp had
resulted in the upholding of the statute.50
Given the court's treatment of the propriety of declaratory relief,
the ruling of the Second Circuit on this issue was entirely proper. If
the state statute is not subject to an interpretation which would avoid
the constitutional questions, the federal court should exercise its juris-
diction. 51 In the absence of such an alternative, there is no need to
have the state courts adjudicate the claim first.5 2 As the court noted,
the Connecticut statute involved in Thorns was broad enough to apply
to clothing resembling the flag.53 Thus, even a narrow interpretation
of the statute would not have excluded the plaintiff's proposed ac-
tivities from the sweep of the statute's coverage.
Once the court had dispensed with the procedural aspects in
Thorns, it was able to proceed to the merits. The Second Circuit
affirmed the three-judge court's declaration that the Connecticut statute
was unconstitutional.54 Following its earlier decision in Long Island
Vietnam Moratorium Committee v. Cahn,5 the Thorns court stated
that the statute was so broadly drafted as to infringe upon constitu-
tionally protected symbolic speech, was overly vague, and was not
divisible into flag misuse and flag defilement parts.5 6
In Cahn, the Second Circuit held that the state's interest in in-
suring respect for the national and state flags is not proper if the state
49 473 F.2d at 485-86. The district court in Thorns could have stayed its hand until
the state proceedings reached a final conclusion. If the state court struck down the statute,
no action need be taken by the federal court. However, if the statute were upheld in state
court, the district court could issue the declaratory judgment, thereby granting Thorns his
relief and allowing the state court an opportunity to rule on the statute prior to any
federal interference. Such an approach raises two considerations. The first is the question
of comity, which is presumably protected by the three-judge district court arrangement.
The second is the resultant delay and possible "chilling effect" on the federal plaintiff's
first amendment rights. Hopefully, this would be paramount when the three-judge court
considers whether or not to stay its hand pending the state court determination. The
Thorns panel rejected this approach in light of the primacy of first amendment rights. Id.
O old.
61 Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965). See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360 (1964).
62 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241
(1967).
63 See 473 F.2d at 486 nA.
14 Id. at 486.
15 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1970). The attack in Cahn was directed at a New York statute,
section 136(a) of the General Business Law, which was substantially the same as the
Connecticut statute. The panel consisted of Chief Judge Lumbard and Circuit Judges
Waterman and Anderson.
G0473 F.2d at 486.
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requires flag worship by the imposition of taboos regarding flag dis-
play.57 Thus, the state has no interest which would justify interference
with a means of symbolic protest. 58 In the absence of Cahn, the resolu-
tion of the constitutional question would have been a very difficult
proposition. There are cases which support both the view that such
statutes are constitutional 59 and the view that such statutes violate first
amendment rights.6 0 As previously noted, the Connecticut courts up-
held the validity of that state's statute.61 The Thorns court was not
confronted with this difficult problem because of available circuit
precedent.
The Supreme Court has held that federal courts must not inter-
fere with pending state proceedings against a federal plaintiff absent
extraordinary circumstances. The Second Circuit in Thorns refused
to extend Sarnuels and Younger to situations where the state action is
directed against another person who is asserting the same rights as a
federal plaintiff. The court's ruling will permit greater federal intru-
sion into state proceedings and thus offend the principles of comity
enunciated in Younger and its progeny. A federal declaration that a
state enactment is unconstitutional, issued during the pendancy of
state proceedings, interferes with those proceedings, no matter who
commenced the federal action. Moreover, a Thorns plaintiff does not
even have to establish that he will be irreparably harmed or that the
state authorities are proceeding in bad faith. This liberality is incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's efforts to reduce federal interference
with state court proceedings.
In addition, the court's liberal interpretation of the "credible
threat of enforcement" test and its finding that the appellee had stand-
ing to assert his constitutional claims may compound the problem.
When coupled with the holding that Sarnuels and Younger are in-
applicable a possibility arises that federal courts will be inundated
by such suits.
As for the three-judge court labyrinth, the Second Circuit followed
the lead of the Supreme Court by limiting the number of cases that
57 437 F.2d at 349.
58 Id. at 350. The plaintiffs in Cahn circulated buttons on which were printed a cir-
cular version of the American flag on which a peace symbol was superimposed. Id. at 346.
59 See, e.g., Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
969 (1972); Sutherland v. DeWulf, 323 F. Supp. 740 (S.D. Ill. 1971); People v. Radich, 26
N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 401
U.S. 531 (1971).
60 See, e.g., Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.
1970); Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Crosson v. Silver, 319 F. Supp.
1004 (D. Ariz. 1970).
61 See note 38 supra.
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can be reviewed directly by the Court. While this approach is not in
accord with the original congressional desire to have federal decisions
invalidating state statutes reviewed expeditiously by the Court, a
restrictive interpretation seems justified in order to keep the Supreme
Court's docket within manageable proportions. The long-term solution
lies in revision of the statutory provisions governing three-judge courts.
NATURE OF SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION REQUIRED FoR
THREE-JUDGE Dis'ntRIr COURT
Nieves v. Oswald
A suit brought in a federal court to enjoin the enforcement of a
state statute, administrative order, or regulation which is of state-wide
application, must be decided by a district court of three judges.' The
single district judge who receives such a complaint and motion for a
three-judge court must determine whether a substantial federal ques-
tion exists thereby warranting the convocation of a three-judge district
court.2 The statutory scheme authorizing the three-judge district court,
and the accompanying provisions governing appellate review,3 have
been the source of endless jurisdictional headaches for both judges and
litigants. 4
128 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). Three-judge court legislation stems from a concern expressed
in the early part of this century that single-judge district courts had abused their power
to issue injunctions against state statutes, especially statutes regulating transportation and
industry. Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471, 476 (1970); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111,
116 (1965); Note, Federal Jurisdiction - Three-Judge Courts - The Recent Evolution in
Jurisdiction and Appellate Review, 61 Mic. L. REv. 1528, 1529 (1963); Note, The Three-
Judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation: A Procedural Anachronism, 27 U. CHI.
L. RaV. 555, 556 (1960). There was a feeling that federal judges had "run wild" in their
issuance of injunctions against state legislation. Note, The Three-Judge Court and Appel-
late Review, 49 U. VA. L. REv. 538,539 (1963).
The purpose of § 2281 is "to prevent a single federal judge from being able to
paralyze totally the operation of an entire regulatory scheme... by issuance of
a broad injunctive order"....
Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967), quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
154 (1962).
In providing for three-judge courts, Congress acted to protect and benefit the interests
of the states. Indeed, it was thought that parties attacking state enactments were overly
protected. Currie, The Three-Judge Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv.
1, 77 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Currie]; Note, The Three-Judge District Court: Scope and
Procedure under Section 2281, 77 HARv. L. REv. 299, 300 (1963). See Astro Cinema Corp.
v. Mackell, 422 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970).
2 Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1961);
Bistrick v. Univ. of S. C., 319 F. Supp. 193, 194 (D.S.C. 1970); Glancy v. Parole Bd. of the
Mich. Dep't of Corrections, 287 F. Supp. 34, 37 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Powell v. Workmen's
Compensation Bd. of N.Y., 214 F. Supp. 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 327 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.
1963).
a Either party can appeal directly to the Supreme Court from an order issued by a
three-judge district court granting or denying injunctive relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
4 One distinguished authority has said that:
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